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From Parameters, Autumn 1996, pp. 108-120. .
Force XXI has proven to be an ambitious and farsighted Army vision of future warfighting and a tribute to nowretired
Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan. Because it is an institutional attempt at US Army reform, however, the
changes being promoted are at times more evolutionary than revolutionary. Force XXI organizations-at brigade,
division, and ultimately corps levels-will represent a synthesis of conventional military hardware with integrated digital
communications. This experimental force will exist within and dominate the battlefield defined by the range of human
senses; it is essentially the force and the concept of the battlefield with which the United States defeated Iraq in 1991.
This article argues that the traditional perception of the battlefield reveals the limiting assumptions upon which Force
XXI is built, that it is constrained by its three dimensions, and that it is most likely outmoded. Paradoxically, it is the
rise of nonWestern warfare and the proliferation of advanced weaponry that together have made current "spatial
concepts" of the modern battlefield obsolete.[1] To be an effective military force into the 21st century, the US Army
should start now to redefine the battlefield so that new operational concepts can evolve and produce the doctrine and
materiel requirements that will lead to meaningful restructuring of all components of the land force. Without a new
conceptual model, Force XXI will fail to take full advantage of the potential inherent in new and emerging technology,
no matter how successful it is in developing technology appliqués for its existing fleets of tanks, infantry fighting
vehicles, artillery systems, and aircraft.
Modern Battlespace
The Army's Field Manual (FM) 1005, Operations (June 1993), defines the modern battlefield, or battlespace as it is
called, as follows:
Battle space is a physical volume that expands or contracts in relation to the ability to acquire and engage
the enemy.[2]
Components [are] determined by the maximum capabilities of a unit to acquire and dominate the enemy;
[it] includes areas beyond the AO [area of operations]; it varies over time according to how the
commander positions his assets.[3]
The above passages share a common liability: they ignore the electromagnetic spectrum.[4] Department of the Army
Pamphlet (DA Pam) 5255, Force XXI Operations, a visionary document published in 1994 by the Army's Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC), better defines battlespace:
Components of this space are determined by the maximum capabilities of friendly and enemy forces to
acquire and dominate each other by fires and maneuver and in the electromagnetic spectrum.[5]
Current Army thought holds that battlespace is composed of separate, discrete physical and electromagnetic
dimensions, each of which must be controlled if friendly operations are to be successful. Recent naval doctrinal
publications share that perception.[6] Military forces are said to operate in the physical dimension, which represents
the world in which humans and their machines move and fight. The boundaries of this specific "threedimensional
battlespace" are, for the purposes of this article, defined by the limitations of humansensing capabilities. Conversely,

information warfare is said to be conducted within the electromagnetic realm where there are no physical military
forces.[7]
The Army's outmoded definition of battlespace has proven adequate for maneuver warfare in the threedimensional
physical battlespace. Armored spearheads and amphibious thrusts seek to defeat opposing forces by exploiting
weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Maneuver warfare with its encirclements, flanking operations, and disruption of the
enemy's command and control processes works well within the constraints of a physical dimension where military
forces and the human senses operate. It has, in fact, come to represent the dominant Western mode of warfare.
The concept of extended battlespace developed in Force XXI operations enlarges this concept of the physical
threedimensional battlefield with an increase in depth, breadth, and height, but in no way fundamentally alters it. In
fact, the attribute of extended battlespace that comes closest to challenging the linear assumptions that underpin current
doctrine is the concept of the "empty battlefield." This concept, loosely described as the dispersal of forces for survival
purposes, is significant because it most clearly depicts the breakdown of some of the fundamental assumptions-and
hence principles-of warfare dominated for several centuries by Western philosophies.[8]
Future Battlespace
The reason for this breakdown of our Western mode of warfare is twofold. First, nontraditional adversaries and forms
of conflict have evolved in the recent past that challenge the assumptions that underpin maneuver warfare. Various
"grayarea phenomena," including terrorists, narcocartels, and forces based on clan and ethnic affiliations bring to
conflict characteristics that are asymmetrical to conventional Western forms of warfare.[9] And since safety for such
forces may be achieved by staying off of the conventional battlefield, they have no option but to leave the
threedimensional battlespace acknowledged in US doctrine and disappear in accord with the maxim "if you can't see a
force you can't kill it."
Examples of this form of disappearance include the use of underground tunnel networks at Cu Chi and the integration
of the Vietcong among the populace in Vietnam, the civilian clothing of a terrorist, and the blending of snipers into
unarmed Somali mobs. Since these forces have left the humansensing dimension in which maneuver warfare
dominates, maneuverbased doctrine is insufficient when applied against them.
Second, the breakdown in maneuver warfare can also be seen in the advent of advanced target detection and precision
guided munitions.[10] Any military force, even those fielded by the West, which exists within the dimension of the
human senses can now be acquired and killed. Since maneuver warfare doctrine was based on a synthesis of
decadesold technology and ideas, it is not surprising that the advanced technologies now emerging negate the
presumed benefits that justified this earlier synthesis. The only solution to this dilemma again requires leaving the
humansensing dimension and disappearing-or seeming to do so. The stealth fighter and the submarine both rely on this
tactic as their primary form of defense.
Stealth capability has not yet been an applicable technical option for landbased and amphibious forces, so tactical and
operational innovations have been developed by way of compensation. This has resulted in Western military forces
increasingly turning their attention toward the development of advanced maneuver warfare concepts. Nonlinear
operational concepts based on the absence of front lines or any recognizable rear area have been developing in Russia
for a number of years and are extensively described in various publications.[11] Similar concepts existed in the
midtolate 1980s in TRADOC's Army 21 Interim Operational Concept, with its references to islands of conflict and
deliberate noncontiguity on the battlefield.[12]
The value of stealth capability has, however, been recognized; it was given a priority one requirement in the May 1994
ARPA Report of the Senior Working Group on Military Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Termed "Invisible
Soldier Image Avoidance and Signature Reduction," it called for a capability that would "make the individual soldier
invisible, day or night, to the whole range of battlefield sensors across the electromagnetic spectrum."[13] As one
outcome of this recognized need we may expect the United States to develop and use either active or metamorphic
camouflage systems for defensive purposes.
Advanced Battlespace Concepts

As noted earlier, the implementation of Force XXI will likely be severely compromised unless an advanced definition
of battlespace is created to support it. I propose that it should be based upon two spatial concepts--humanspace and
cyberspace--and two spatial transcendents--stealth and data fusion (see Figure 1).[14]

Humanspace represents the traditional physical dimension of the human senses within which military forces operate.
This spatial concept has already been defined in Force XXI Operations, omitting the electromagnetic aspect.
Cyberspace, on the other hand, represents not only the electromagnetic spectrum, but also that dimension in which
military forces seek refuge for defensive purposes. Forces that enter this dimension are removed from the
humansensingbased battlefield and are thus invulnerable to attack; at the same time, they retain the capacity to attack
military forces that exist in humanspace. Any military force that has the capability of entering this nonhumansensing
dimension, be it Western or nonWestern, must now be considered, respectively, either a highly advanced asset or a
direct threat. Since emerging forms of nonWestern warfare and advanced technology applications appear to possess
many of the same operational characteristics, this is not an unreasonable characterization.[15]
As an outcome of the development of the concepts of humanspace and cyberspace, a more precise definition of
battlespace dominance in the 21st century may also be required. Cyberspace may be considered dominant over
humanspace. For this reason, the goal of the Army in future war, beyond that of securing assigned politicomilitary
objectives, will be that of total cyberspace dominance-not just digital battlespace dominance.[16] Army forces may
ultimately look toward cyberspace as a place of refuge from attack while denying that refuge and capability to
opposing forces.
The means of entering this refuge will be based upon the application of stealth technology and processes.[17] In
hindsight, it can be said that when Mao Zedong referred to guerrillas as fish in a sea of surrounding population he was
inadvertently stating early principles of what we would now term stealth and cyberspace.[18] Advanced weaponry,
beyond that of the submarine, bomber (B2), and fighter (F117), is now being configured for the very purpose of
exploiting the recognized defensive potential stealth offers. Followon programs to the 21st Century Land Warrior
project seek to incorporate chameleonlike camouflage composed of biomaterials into the modular Soldier Integrated
Protection Ensemble (SIPE) system.[19] Cruise missile successors to the canceled AGM137A TriService Standoff
Attack Missile (TSSAM), as well as the recently unveiled Army RAH66 Comanche scout/light attack helicopter, are
also now stealthbased.
The counter to stealthmasked forces will be based upon the spatial transcendent of data fusion.[20] Just as stealth
allows a military force to leave humanspace and enter cyberspace, data fusion will negate the protection stealth
provides. Data fusion describes the concept of using information gathered across the electromagnetic spectrum to
locate stealthmasked military forces in space and time.[21] In future operations, opposing forces that appear invisible
to conventional means of detection and identification will be identifiable via superior data fusion systems and
procedures so that they can be immediately neutralized or destroyed. The urgency here acknowledges that each of the
opposing forces will be operating within its own data acquisition and informationprocessing cycles.[22] Differences in
response times measured in seconds will separate the quick and the dead.

Based upon this tension between stealth and data fusion, the "humansensing dimensional barrier" separating
humanspace and cyberspace will represent a dynamic and contested frontier, a transdimensional forward edge of the
battle area (FEBA) between opposing forces.[23] As a result, new spatial premises of offense and defense may develop
based on two basic formulas. Whenever individuals, organizations, and materiel can avoid or counter efforts at data
fusion, those entities can be said to be operating in cyberspace. Conversely, when efforts to counter data fusion fail, the
entities will be considered to be operating within humanspace, vulnerable to attacks by an adversary, whether a
stealthy cruise missile or a sniper heretofore concealed in the midst of a crowd. The two concepts can be expressed as
follows:

These spatial premises of advanced battlespace can be viewed in Figure 2, which portrays a threedimensional volume
of battlespace bisected by a humansensing fourth dimensional barrier. (Were time to be included in this concept of
battlespace, it would represent a fifth dimensional attribute.) The figure is misleading-humanspace and cyberspace
actually coexist in a given volume of battlespace-but it will have to suffice until conventions for expressing these
concepts have become commonplace. Because stealth masked forces are inherently "invisible" to normal military
forces, they can maneuver with relative impunity in cyberspace. Hence, the "battlefield" addressed in this essay, and
portrayed crudely in Figure 2, appears to have twice the potential volume of the battlespace currently defined in FM
1005 and being applied to develop Force XXI theory.

Army forces will rely upon the "maneuver force protection" envisioned in Force XXI Operations to extend their ability
to conduct operations.[24] Within a few decades, however, nonstealthmasked Army forces will have become highly
vulnerable-even with the development of high technology proactive armor and point defense systems.[25] For this
reason, the initial digitalization of Army mechanized and armor forces which rely upon maneuver as the basis of their
operational art, while a bold move, can still only be viewed as an incremental step into future warfare.
This redefinition of battlespace suggests that our traditional concepts of maneuver warfare may be made obsolete
because forces that conduct maneuver warfare operate in humanspace, and humanspace represents the killing ground
of future war. One can only speculate when-or if-this style of warfighting might be replaced by dispersed land forces
engaging in cybermaneuver as a complement to precisionstrike operations conducted by stealthcloaked missiles and
aircraft.[26]
Cybermaneuver Concepts

With this redefinition of the battlefield based upon principles of dualdimensional space, early concepts of
cybermaneuver may now find their way into future editions of Force XXI Operations. The potential need for the
development of such a new form of doctrine was recognized in 1992 by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt in a RAND
paper entitled Cyberwar is Coming![27]
For an example of what cybermaneuver warfare may look like, consider two opposing helicopters in a meeting
engagement. Initially, each helicopter will rely upon stealth technologies to keep itself off the other's battlefield. Both
will be using data fusion and informationcycle processing technologies in an effort to acquire, identify, and engage the
other. One belligerent will momentarily gain the initiative by using data fusion to force the other out of cyberspace and
into humanspace. Finally, the "uncloaked" helicopter will be engaged by the other, whose intent will be to neutralize or
destroy it before it can take offensive action itself or escape back into a "cyberspace" mode of operation by using
countermeasures to defeat data fusion activities. Early, primitive applications of this concept include the firing of flares
by aircraft to confuse heatseeking missiles, or technology applied to helicopters to mask their infrared signature for the
same purpose.
Similar concepts of battlespace underlay the functional basis of countersniper systems. Snipers, it can be argued, use
cyberspace as their principle form of defense. They deftly stalk their intended targets by using disciplined body
motions and breathing control to reach a suitable firing position without detection. After neutralizing their intended
target, they fade back into cyberspace and either vanish forever or wait minutes, maybe hours, before momentarily
letting their presence again be known with another kill. The danger of snipers for Army forces deployed overseas is
growing in proportion to increasing urbanization.[28] That insurgents operating in these environments are likely to be
dispersed among innocent noncombatants and have access to precisionguided munitions (PGMs) is a more ominous
concern.[29]
To deal with the sniper threat, a new defensive system called Lifeguard has been developed at the US Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratories. Based on stateoftheart commercial technologies, it can locate the point of origin of a
bullet in flight within hundredths of a second. While Lifeguard is unable to return fire, a combat version with this
capability, known as Deadeye, is under development.[30] In essence, this countersniper system, like the helicopter
used in the first example, takes a cyberspacebased force, in this instance a sniper, and strips it of its invulnerability to
attack by bringing it into humanspace by means of data fusion. A sniper faced with this new technology has a range of
choices, none of which is particularly appealing: decline to fire his weapon, target the countersniper system initially in
hopes of disabling it (first the sniper must locate it, of course), or be equipped with innovative means for
circumventing such technology.
These two examples bring up the most significant challenge that will probably face forces operating in cyberspace.
Whenever they actively acquire an adversary in cyberspace, thereby moving it into humanspace, even if only for a few
seconds, they will likely betray their own position in space and time. At that point, both the attacker and the intended
victim can be engaged directly by other killing forces, be engaged by other allied forces via shared informational
awareness, or launch strikes against opposing forces in humanspace. This window of vulnerability will likely be one of
the primary features of the sort of information dominance that must be readily available to Force XXI and denied to
opposition forces.[31]
As a result of technology evolution, future Army commanders may view the battlefield by means of realtime
holographic displays. All friendly forces can be made to appear on these displays; technically sophisticated opposition
forces will appear and disappear from these displays as they are acquired and escape detection, literally "popping" out
of and back into cyberspace. Forces in such a scenario would probably become quickly intermingled, resulting in a
blurring of our traditional concepts of front lines and the tactical, operational, and strategic continuum.[32] In fact,
older military forces and those forces of less advanced national and nonnational entities which exist and function in
humanspace can expect to be engaged simultaneously across the physical continuum by precision fires in the opening
stages of a conflict.[33] The concept of safe rear areas would conceivably no longer exist because the entire
humansensing dimension would indeed become the battlefield. Within this context, safety would be gained only by
means of the "cyberspace shifting" of forces and other national security assets outside the boundaries of traditional
humanspace.

Such a perspective on the future battlefield reinforces the need for digital interoperability standards, the seamless
tracking and engagement of enemy targets, and a future Army force structure primarily configured around stealthbased
forces.[34] Based on these perceptions, a failure to explore cybermaneuver as an emerging warfighting style potentially
risks setting up the Force XXI Army for a catastrophe much like that which befell France in the spring of 1940 when it
eschewed both the new German operational art which had developed and the expanded concept of the battlefield
underlying it.
Conclusion
The concepts developed in this essay represent an initial attempt to give substance to the meaning of "asymmetry" in
forceonforce relationships. It has been proposed that advanced forces gain an asymmetrical battlefield advantage over
traditional forces by means of techniques and processes such as cloaking, blending into civilian populations,
concealment, and deception-all of which allow them to avoid detection by entering a realm which is frequently called
cyberspace. At the same time, traditional forces, which remain in humanspace, are subject to detection and attack by
these nowstealthy systems. Current and emerging precision strike capabilities support this perception. When one force
can attack another force and in the process not be attacked in return, a clear battlefield advantage exists.
Our traditional concepts of threedimensional battlespace are unable to explain such a military revolution because
increases in the physical dimensions of a battlefield cannot account for it. Rather, a new concept of range is required,
one that is defined by a "humansensing dimensional barrier" which separates humanspace from cyberspace. Given this
perceptual lens, a terrorist in civilian garb who is standing five meters from a US soldier and whom the US soldier
views as a noncombatant is at a much greater battlefield range from that soldier than a hostile tank that is visible 1000
meters away-and yet is potentially far more dangerous to the soldier than is the tank. To counter such forces, we will
most likely be required to rely upon principles of data fusion which can provide us with the capability to bring such
cloaked entities out into the open where they can be neutralized or destroyed. A number of implications can be derived
from the development of such a technically advanced battlespace that bear directly on the Army's conduct of war in the
future:
The US Army should explore the development of cybermaneuver doctrine in support of Force XXI. It is
proposed that such doctrine could better exploit the advanced battlespace which is developing than more
traditionally based warfighting concepts such as maneuver or maneuver force protection as described in FM
1005 and DA Pam 5255 respectively. Cybermaneuver doctrine would be a natural complement to maturing
precision strike concepts which are focused upon the neutralization or destruction of opposing
humanspaceresiding forces. Implicit in this doctrine would be the development of a capability to defeat opposing
stealthmasked forces.
Lighter forces may possess more of a defensive advantage than heavier forces because lighter forces can more
easily seek the defensive advantages that cyberspace offers. This could mean that defense would no longer be
measured by such traditional concepts as heavier armor or even speed, but rather by the ability of a force to
make itself "invisible" to detection.
A further blurring of the distinction between soldier and civilian may likely result. War in the Western world has
been conducted from the time of Frederick the Great by armies wearing distinctive uniforms which have
distinguished combatants from noncombatants and one opposing army from another. Our modern camouflaged
battledress uniforms are based upon this evolutionary pattern of uniform development. These uniforms are not
worn by many soldiers representing nonWestern cultures because behavioral norms and ethical systems to which
these soldiers subscribe allow them to discard the symbols of the soldier in order to obtain the defensive benefits
that cyberspace provides. We may expect this trend to intensify as American dominance of the humanspace
battlefield increases.
The perceptual abilities of US soldiers will likely be enhanced to provide them with "extrahumansensing
capabilities" which will allow them to peer into cyberspace for the purposes of identifying threat forces. Two
methods may be employed. The first is by technical means such as the Land Warrior program, which provides
night vision capability. The second is by better exploiting the organic capabilities of our troops by training them
to be aware of the different smells, habits, and behaviors of warriors in specific cultures or ethnic groups with
which we may find ourselves in conflict.
If our traditional concept of front lines-linearity-becomes blurred because of the effects of the "humansensing

dimensional barrier" separating cyberspace from humanspace, we may expect that the tactical, operational, and
strategic continuum as we now understand it will be reexamined and possibly redefined. The threedimensional
quality of that traditional continuum cannot be expected to define the reality of a fourthdimensional battlespace
where rear areas and flanks may no longer exist, and where what was in earlier times known as the "Zone of the
Interior" (the continental United States) is part of the region of conflict.
Implications such as these could prove difficult for an Army victorious in the Gulf War to consider, much less accept,
because they challenge both the core of its doctrinal sensibilities and its traditional force structure preferences. Yet the
value of informed challenges was recognized by General Sullivan, writing as Chief of Staff, along with Lieutenant
Colonel Anthony M. Coroalles:
Ideas that have the potential to overturn longestablished, bureaucratically entrenched methods of operation
are not welcomed by the average man. When the paradigm shifts, most cannot grasp the full potential of
new ideas. New technologies and processes can frighten those who are comfortable with the routines
established to accommodate the old technologies. Furthermore, vested interests within the organization and
within its bureaucracy-usually for what to them are good and logical reasons-will resist ideas that threaten
the status quo. Bureaucracies flourish on procedures instituted to ensure efficiency. Innovation is the
enemy of efficiency because it threatens established procedures. This is a mindset that we cannot afford in
Force XXI. While military professionals must hold the security of the nation as something with which
they dare not gamble, they cannot afford to discourage the kind of imagination and innovation that is
needed to meet the varied challenges that will arise in the 21st century.[35]
To be a relevant military force in the next century, the Army must learn to adapt itself like an entrepreneurial
organization to the social, political, economic, and military changes which are now upon us. While Army traditions
based upon individual integrity, honor, and service to country must be retained, those based on discredited perceptions
of the battlefield and of warfighting itself will be left where they belong-in the twilight of the 20th century.
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